1. Socrates is dissatisfied with Meno’s first answer to the question ‘What is virtue?’ because it is:
   a. the wrong definition.
   b. an essential property, not a definition.
   c. a list.
   d. too vague.

2. Socrates’ answer to the ‘paradox of inquiry’ is that inquiry is worthwhile:
   a. even if we know what we are searching for.
   b. even if we do not know what we are searching for.
   c. if what we are searching for is valuable.
   d. if what we are searching for has a single definition.

3. Among other findings, the slave boy example shows that:
   a. Socrates can lead the slave boy to the correct answers.
   b. the slave boy’s master must have taught him geometry.
   c. recollection only works with instruction.
   d. the slave boy’s realizing that he does not know is progress.

4. Socrates cannot answer Meno’s initial question ‘Is virtue teachable?’ because:
   a. it is badly stated.
   b. he does not know what virtue is.
   c. he is ignorant of what teaching is.
   d. there are no teachers of virtue.

5. In the closing sections of Meno where Socrates and Meno discuss whether virtue is teachable, Plato understands knowledge as roughly:
   a. true opinion.
   b. true opinion for a reason.
   c. true opinion with an account.
   d. true opinion that is recollected.

6. Socratic inquiry assumes that an answer to the ‘What is F?’ question (e.g., What is virtue?) must:
   a. provide a way to pick out Fs.
   b. be a single thing.
   c. be easily taught.
   d. take the form of stating what things are F.
Quiz 2
Plato, *Myth of the Cave*

1. The analogy of the Cave is best viewed as:
   a. an account of the liberation of mankind from ignorance to knowledge.
   b. an explanation of the nature of the Forms.
   c. an account of the education of the philosopher.
   d. contrasting those who are willing to know reality and those who refuse to know it.

2. In the analogy of the Sun, the good is to the _____ world what the sun is to the _____ world:
   a. abstract / real.
   b. intelligible / visible.
   c. invisible / visible.
   d. supernatural / natural.

3. After viewing the Sun, the philosopher returns to the Cave:
   a. hopefully.
   b. joyously.
   c. indifferently.
   d. regretfully.

4. Socrates claims that the people chained in the Cave are:
   a. angered with their state.
   b. like us.
   c. like we would be in a corrupt city.
   d. suffering and knowing it.

5. The people chained in the Cave view the returning philosopher:
   a. warmly.
   b. critically.
   c. resentfully.
   d. hopefully.
Quiz 3
Gettier, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”

1. If Gettier’s counter-example to the traditional analysis of knowledge succeeds it shows that justified true belief is not ____ for knowledge.
   a. necessary
   b. sufficient
   c. necessary and sufficient.
   d. necessary or sufficient

2. One of Gettier’s main assumptions is that:
   a. a justified belief must be true.
   b. a justified belief can be true.
   c. justified belief is not preserved by deduction.
   d. justified belief is preserved by deduction.

3. In Gettier’s example, if it is false but justified for Smith that Jones owns a Ford, then:
   a. Smith is not justified in believing that Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona.
   b. it is false that Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona.
   c. if it is true that Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona then Smith knows it.
   d. Smith does not know that Jones owns a Ford or Brown is in Barcelona.
Quiz 4

Descartes, “Meditations on First Philosophy”

1. In Meditation 1, Descartes reasons that if a belief is false, then anything that rests on it is:
   a. false.
   b. improbable.
   c. doubtful.
   d. implausible.

2. In the last stage of Descartes’ methodical skepticism he _______ that there is an evil demon intent on deceiving him.
   a. supposes
   b. argues
   c. believes
   d. doubts

3. In Meditations 2 and 6, Descartes argues that he:
   a. necessarily exists.
   b. is essentially a mind.
   c. is essentially a body.
   d. is essentially both mind and body.

4. Descartes argues that we are capable of error, even if God exists, because:
   a. God is not all powerful.
   b. our understanding can extend further than our will.
   c. God can deceive.
   d. our will can extend further than our understanding.

5. For Descartes, what is crucial about “I am I exist” is that it:
   a. is certainly true whenever I think it.
   b. follows from God’s not being a deceiver.
   c. must always be true.
   d. is inferred from the premise that “I think.”

6. In Meditation 3, a key premise in Descartes’ proof of God’s existence is:
   a. God is no deceiver.
   b. the cause must have at least as much reality as the effect.
   c. If something can be doubted, then it should not be believed.
   d. If there is an evil demon, there must be a God.
7. At the start of the Meditations, Descartes puts forth the general criterion to guide his search for a foundation for knowledge that he should not assent to a statement if that statement is:
   a. false.
   b. obviously false.
   c. wholly dubious.
   d. at all dubious.

8. In Meditation 1, Descartes initially takes the argument that we cannot rely on our senses to require only that he show that they:
   a. sometimes mislead.
   b. often mislead.
   c. always mislead.
   d. almost always mislead.

9. Among the beliefs that might still be certain even if I am dreaming is that:
   a. I am sitting in my chair.
   b. the sum of the angles of a triangle is 180 degrees.
   c. the earth moves.
   d. Paris is the capital of France.

10. The high standards of Descartes’ criterion for assent are meant to apply:
    a. practically to action as well to as theoretically to knowledge.
    b. practically to action but not theoretically to knowledge.
    c. neither practically to action nor theoretically to knowledge.
    d. not practically to action, but only theoretically to knowledge.

11. The evil demon cannot deceive Descartes that he exists when he thinks that he does because deception:
    a. would be blocked by an all-good, all-powerful God.
    b. requires knowledge.
    c. requires thought.
    d. is subject to doubt.

12. Descartes introduces the argument of the wax (Meditation 2) to show that:
    a. external objects are known through the senses.
    b. the mind is better known than the body.
    c. the senses do not really perceive the wax.
    d. he can be deceived into thinking there is wax in his hands, when there isn’t any.

13. Descartes’ crucial observation about the wax is that:
    a. it melts when heated.
    b. its shape and texture can be altered.
    c. what I believe about it is due to what I perceive in it.
    d. I continue to know it, despite numerous external changes.
Quiz 5

Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding

1. The skeptical solution to Hume’s skeptical doubts involves:
   a. a proof that induction or knowledge of the future is possible.
   b. a proof that the future must be like the past.
   c. nature’s having made us users of inductive inference.
   d. a refutation of his skeptical doubts.

2. A crucial step in Hume’s skepticism with regard to the understanding (or induction or arguments from experience) is that:
   a. relations of ideas may be false.
   b. it is no self-contradiction to deny that a regularity persists into the future.
   c. we cannot have impressions from the future or unobserved.
   d. relations of ideas must be true.

3. Hume equates (true) matters of fact with those which are:
   a. necessarily true.
   b. known a priori (without experience).
   c. known a posteriori (with experience).
   d. uncertain.

4. For Hume, the uniformity of nature:
   a. if denied, implies a contradiction.
   b. can only be shown true through inductive argument.
   c. implies that causal relations are inherent in objects.
   d. is assumed by transitions among relations of ideas.

5. Impressions and ideas differ in their:
   a. vivacity
   b. duration.
   c. intuitive credibility.
   d. meaningfulness.

6. For Hume, a miracle is:
   a. an act of god.
   b. any event that is highly unexpected.
   c. impossible.
   d. a violation of the laws of nature.

7. For Hume the dispute over liberty (free will) and necessity (determinism):
   a. is irresolvable.
   b. is verbal.
   c. requires rejecting liberty.
   d. requires rejecting necessity.
8. Hume’s “solution” to his skepticism (in regards to induction or experiential arguments) is:
   a. descriptive.
   b. normative.
   c. both descriptive and normative.
   d. neither descriptive nor normative.

9. For Hume, liberty is not:
   a. to act responsibly.
   b. to act freely.
   c. for one’s actions to be caused.
   d. to act out of chance.

10. Liberty requires:
    a. causality.
    b. chance.
    c. moral responsibility.
    d. spontaneity.

11. A key problem for an empiricist like Hume is to explain our knowledge of the:
    a. past.
    b. present.
    c. observable.
    d. unobservable.

12. The attempt to justify the uniformity of nature is:
    a. valid.
    b. circular.
    c. invalid.
    d. unnecessary.

13. Hume’s conclusion about miracles is best expressed as:
    a. there are no miracles.
    b. there probably are no miracles.
    c. we should be cautious in accepting reports of a miracle.
    d. there is good reason to doubt any report of a miracle.

14. Hume’s doubts about testimony of miracles stem from:
    a. his doubts that much testimony is truthful.
    b. evidence for laws of nature.
    c. his disbelief in god.
    d. his disbelief in miracles.

15. For Hume, no testimony can establish a miracle unless:
    a. the falsehood of the testimony is proven.
    b. the truth of the testimony is proven.
    c. the falsehood of the testimony would be more miraculous.
    d. the truth of the testimony would be more miraculous.
16. Which of the following would Hume classify as a relation of ideas:
   a. The earth revolves around the sun.
   b. Cats are cute.
   c. No man is immortal.
   d. 2+3=5

17. For Hume, the foundation of knowledge is:
   a. ideas.
   b. impressions.
   c. matters of fact.
   d. relations of ideas.

18. Causation for Hume is:
   a. necessary connections.
   b. constant conjunction.
   c. an illusion.
   d. opposed to liberty.

19. Morality for Hume requires:
   a. chance.
   b. impressions.
   c. responsibility.
   d. unpredictability.

20. In support of compatibilism, Hume observes that peoples’ actions are mainly:
   a. spontaneous.
   b. unique.
   c. regular.
   d. necessary.

21. Hume claims that causation as regularity or succession of events is the same as (“in other words”):
   a. necessary connection.
   b. habit or custom.
   c. were the cause not to occur, the effect would not.
   d. the laws of nature as impossible to violate.

22. Hume’s test for the meaningfulness of a philosophical term rests on the distinction between:
   a. matters of fact and relations of ideas.
   b. necessity and contingency.
   c. a priori and a posteriori
   d. impressions and ideas.
23. Every thought or idea, for Hume, must be analyzable as a set:
   a. of impressions.
   b. of matter of fact truths.
   c. of observations.
   d. of relations of ideas.

24. Whenever ideas are intelligible and can be distinctly conceived they imply, for Hume:
   a. no contradiction.
   b. no falsehood.
   c. each other.
   d. that there are similar underlying impressions.

25. Liberty, for Hume, should be opposed to:
   a. necessity, not constraint.
   b. constraint, not necessity.
   c. chance and necessity.
   d. necessity, but not chance.

26. Which of the following is not among Hume’s principles for connecting ideas:
   a. resemblance.
   b. continuity in time or place.
   c. reflection.
   d. causality.

27. For Hume, I cannot know a priori that:
   a. 2+10=12.
   b. a new piece of bread will nourish me.
   c. miracles violate laws of nature.
   d. bachelors are unmarried.

28. Reports of miracles are less believable, according to Hume, than reports of:
   a. violations of logical laws.
   b. denials of relations of ideas.
   c. improbable occurrences e.g. someone’s winning a lottery.
   d. the marvelous or extra-ordinary.

29. Hume holds that the belief in genuine chance is explained by:
   a. our ignorance of real causes.
   b. the existence of genuine chance.
   c. custom.
   d. constant conjunction.
Quiz 6

- van Inwagen, “The Incompatibility of Free Will and Determinism”
- Frankfurt, “Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person”
- Nagel, “Moral Luck”

1. The libertarian and hard determinist agree that:
   a. free will and determinism are incompatible.
   b. free will requires determinism.
   c. responsibility requires causal regularity.
   d. free will requires the absence of coercion or compulsion.

2. For van Inwagen, the key step in the argument for incompatibilism is that:
   a. if it is predetermined that you will do something, then you cannot avoid doing that thing.
   b. if anyone could do other than he did, then he could render false the laws of nature.
   c. if someone could render false the laws of nature, he could do other than what he did.
   d. the laws of nature imply that humans do not control their actions.

3. Soft determinists (compatibilists) think that what rules out free will is:
   a. causal determination in general.
   b. coercion or compulsion.
   c. determinism.
   d. the predictability of one’s action.

4. Frankfurt holds that a wanton:
   a. lacks second-order volitions.
   b. is not a human being.
   c. is a person whose second-order volitions are ineffective.
   d. is someone whose first-order volitions are in conflict.

5. A denier of moral luck would hold that when we compare the truck driver who hits the child with the one who does not, though both were equally negligent, we should:
   a. blame them equally.
   b. blame them in proportion to our actual emotional responses.
   c. blame them in accord with which outcome is worse
   d. not blame either, since the negligence was minor.

6. In van Inwagen’s account, determinism claims, that:
   a. no one is free.
   b. all states of the universe are fixed by laws.
   c. every action that occurs is fated to have to occur.
   d. man is wholly the product of his genes and his environmental upbringing.
7. According to Frankfurt, the unwilling addict, as contrasted to the indifferent addict:
   a. has a conflict in his first-order desires.
   b. has a conflict in his second-order volitions.
   c. is someone whose second-order volitions are ineffective.
   d. is someone who fails to have a will.

8. Frankfurt is best classified as a:
   a. compatibilist.
   b. libertarian.
   c. hard determinist.
   d. incompatibilist.

9. The determination of blame or praise according to moral luck is in conflict with:
   a. our natural attitudes in assigning blame or praise.
   b. the view that we are responsible only for what is in our will.
   c. the view that we are responsible for our actions.
   d. the view that we are subject to causal laws.

10. Some soft determinists/compatibilists argue that an action A by X is free if:
    a. it is uncaused.
    b. X could have done otherwise, if he wanted to.
    c. X could have done otherwise, in the same circumstances.
    d. it is not controlled by forces outside the agent.

11. For Frankfurt, if a person has free will then:
    a. he could have done otherwise.
    b. his second-order volitions determine his first-order volitions.
    c. his first-order volitions are not in conflict with each other.
    d. his second-order desires are effective in determining his actions.

12. According to Nagel, the type of luck of the child who is taken from Germany to Argentina at the beginning the Nazi era, in contrast to the one who stays, is:
    a. constitutive luck.
    b. luck in one’s circumstances.
    c. luck in how one is determined by antecedent circumstances.
    d. luck in the way one’s actions and projects turn out.

13. If moral luck is possible, it should affect the evaluation of:
    a. agents, not acts.
    b. acts, not agents.
    c. both acts and agents.
    d. neither acts nor agents.
14. The Kantian view that is challenged by the problem of moral luck is that:
a. an act is morally right only if it meets the test of the categorical imperative.
b. the will is good or bad not because of what it accomplishes but because of its willing alone.
c. to be moral an act must be done out of duty and not merely in conformity to it.
d. a genuine moral principle is not conditional on the inclinations or desires of agents.
Quiz 7

Plato, *Euthyphro*

1. Euthyphro’s first account of piety is rejected because it:
   a. picks out the wrong property to be piety.
   b. does not justify Euthyphro’s prosecution of his father.
   c. is a list.
   d. claims that piety is devotion to the gods.

2. Socrates is justified in asking Euthyphro to answer his “What is F (piety)?” question because:
   a. Socrates wants to know.
   b. They both want to know.
   c. Socrates wants to show Euthyphro that he is wrong.
   d. Euthyphro implies that he knows what piety is.

3. Socrates’ exposes Euthyphro’s first acceptable definition of piety as:
   a. missing important properties.
   b. leading to an inconsistency.
   c. based on an invalid argument.
   d. asymmetric, not an identity.

4. The answer to the “Euthyphro question” that is accepted is that:
   a. the pious is loved by the gods because it is pious.
   b. the pious is pious because it is loved by the gods.
   c. the pious is loved by the gods because it is god-beloved.
   d. the god-beloved and the pious are one and the same.

5. The key step in the refutation of Euthyphro’s equation of the god-beloved and piety depends upon:
   a. symmetry (e.g. if A because B then B because A).
   b. asymmetry (or anti-symmetry).
   c. the fact that the gods quarrel.
   d. substitutivity of identicals.

6. The crucial consequence of the facts that the gods disagree, which Socrates uses to refute Euthyphro’s first definition, is that:
   a. they do not agree on what is pious.
   b. the same act would be pious and impious.
   c. we cannot be pious to all the gods simultaneously.
   d. we cannot learn from the gods to know what is piety.
7. Socratic inquiry generally refutes the one questioned (the interlocutor) by leading him to an inconsistency with:
   a. Socrates.
   b. well founded assumptions.
   c. himself.
   d. common sense.

8. A good illustration of Socratic irony is when Socrates:
   a. asks Euthyphro “What is piety?”
   b. asks Euthyphro to teach him.
   c. questions Euthyphro’s first definition of piety.
   d. asks Euthyphro whether the gods quarrel.
1. Pleasure and happiness are alike in that both are:
   a. aimed at in all activities.
   b. concerned with living well.
   c. distinctive of man.
   d. sought for themselves.

2. Virtue is acquired by:
   a. instinct and action.
   b. instruction and memory.
   c. thought and reflection.
   d. practice and habit.

3. The problem with legal justice is that laws:
   a. are made by fallible legislators.
   b. may violate fundamental ethical principles.
   c. may violate God’s will.
   d. cannot take account of all particular differences.

4. The mean for cheating:
   a. does not exist.
   b. involves not being too greedy.
   c. involves not being too self-sacrificing.
   d. is roughly the same as the mean for dishonesty.

5. In acting morally, the virtuous person derives:
   a. pleasure.
   b. reward.
   c. reciprocity from others.
   d. happiness.

6. The function of man is an activity of the soul in conformity with:
   a. truth.
   b. feeling.
   c. love.
   d. reason.

7. A just man:
   a. takes pleasure in doing what is just.
   b. does what is just regardless of whether it gives him pleasure.
   c. overcomes displeasure to do what is just.
   d. is born just.
8. In his discussion of weakness of will (incontinence), Aristotle rejects Socrates’ view that:
   a. knowledge must be in control or motivate.
   b. weakness of will is not possible.
   c. no one intentionally does wrong.
   d. no one acts against their better judgment.

9. Aristotle’s concept of happiness is closest to:
   a. pleasure.
   b. enjoyable experience.
   c. well being.
   d. wisdom.

10. Which of the following best capture Aristotle’s most fundamental question:
    a. What are the correct moral rules?
    b. How can we maximize overall happiness?
    c. What is the good life for man?
    d. Can virtue be taught?

11. The acquisition of a virtue is like the acquisition of:
    a. a craft.
    b. a job.
    c. good looks.
    d. knowledge of chemistry.

12. Which of the following is not part of the definition of virtue: Virtue is:
    a. a state that decides.
    b. in accord with a mean.
    c. happiness.
    d. determined according to reason.

13. The mean is contrasted to:
    a. the mode or median.
    b. the extremes.
    c. moderation.
    d. vice.

14. To perform a genuinely virtuous action does not require that the agent:
    a. perform the act automatically.
    b. know that the act is virtuous.
    c. decide on the act, and chose it for itself.
    d. chose the right act from a firm character.

15. For moral learning, Aristotle rejects the idea that:
    a. knowledge of, and motivation to do, what is right grow together.
    b. some are not capable of truly successful moral learning.
    c. before you do just acts, you must know what justice is.
    d. we can acquire virtues through habit.
16. The virtue of a human being:
   a. is innate.
   b. allows him to perform his function well.
   c. is relative to that person.
   d. is not what makes a human being good.

17. Happiness can be ruined by:
   a. a life devoted to contemplation.
   b. a life devoted to God.
   c. a lack of external goods like wealth.
   d. a devotion to hitting the mean.

18. Happiness is:
   a. a quality of a whole life.
   b. pleasure.
   c. relative to the individual’s own contentment.
   d. relative to a culture’s own contentment.

19. The best good will be:
   a. virtue.
   b. a good sought for in itself, and for which we seek other ends.
   c. a world in which everyone strives for each other’s happiness.
   d. a life with much pleasure and little pain.

20. The way to discover what happiness is for Aristotle is to determine:
   a. what is the function of a human being.
   b. what people most prefer.
   c. what people most enjoy.
   d. what a life of virtue would be like.

21. An action is involuntary if it is due to:
   a. force.
   b. ignorance.
   c. force or ignorance.
   d. force and ignorance.
1. The Utilitarian attempts to handle the sense of absoluteness in morality (e.g. that it is just wrong to lie) by:
   a. observing that if a lie is told to you, you would be made unhappy by it.
   b. appealing to the greater overall happiness that normally follows from telling lies.
   c. claiming that this sense is an illusion as frequent exceptions to these absolutes indicate.
   d. showing that greater unhappiness is always caused by lying than by truth-telling.

2. Which of the following do not hint at a formulation of the Categorical Imperative:
   a. act to enhance the good of all.
   b. universalize the intention under which you act.
   c. act in accord with a community of rational legislators.
   d. do not treat others as a mere means.

3. An act is right according to Utilitarianism when:
   a. it maximizes the overall happiness.
   b. it can universalize the actor’s intentions.
   c. it accords with a just moral rule.
   d. most people benefit from it.

4. One major objection to utilitarianism is that:
   a. it allows injustices to individuals for the sake of gains in overall utility.
   b. it treats happiness as an ultimate objective of all or almost all human actions and projects.
   c. it does not count individuals' happiness equally.
   d. it seeks to make moral questions into questions answerable by an objective analysis.

5. For Kant, to be genuinely morally motivated is:
   a. to act in conformity with duty.
   b. to act for the sake of duty.
   c. to act out of concern for oneself and others.
   d. to act out of a desire to do good.

6. Kant’s derivation of the Categorical Imperative depends crucially on the idea that the moral law must supply:
   a. an empirical test.
   b. a formal test.
   c. principles that harmonize with human nature.
   d. commands of God.
7. Which of the following is not an advantage of Utilitarianism:
   a. the right act is susceptible to empirical calculation.
   b. each creature that is capable of happiness or pleasure desires it.
   c. it implies a defense of natural rights.
   d. each creature’s pleasure or happiness is counted impartially.

8. For Kant, inclination cannot be a moral motive because it:
   a. is not universalizable.
   b. is not in the agent’s control.
   c. does not affect consequences.
   d. does not affect intentions.

9. Mill replies to the objection that utilitarian calculations are not feasible by:
   a. dismissing the objection as irrelevant.
   b. accepting the objection but thinking it unimportant.
   c. rejecting it as ignoring the history of human learning about what promotes happiness or not.
   d. rejecting it as ignoring the ease with which humans can engage in elaborate calculations.

10. For Kant, what matters for the goodness of the good will is:
    a. whether it accomplishes its goal.
    b. whether it fails to accomplish its goal.
    c. whether what it wills maximizes overall happiness.
    d. internal to the good will itself.

11. In Utilitarianism, the principle that each is to count as one and only one cannot be equated with “one man one vote” because:
    a. utilitarian calculations do not require voting.
    b. the intensity, not just the numbers, count for overall happiness.
    c. the utility gained from bad acts is not counted.
    d. utilitarians reject equality as a value.

12. The point of Mill’s famous remark “better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied” is that:
    a. other features of humans besides pleasure make their lives more valuable than pigs.
    b. some kinds of pleasure are more valuable and desirable than others.
    c. the pleasure experienced by humans is to be counted more than the pleasure experienced by animals.
    d. in the utilitarian calculation we can discount the pleasures of lower animals.

13. One problem with Mill’s proof of the principle of utility—from each desiring their own happiness to the desirability of the happiness of all—is that:
    a. not everyone desires their own happiness.
    b. the inference from something being heard or seen to its being audible or visible is questionable.
    c. desirability must imply worthy of desire, not merely capable of being desired.
    d. many acts that are impermissible are ones which increase the overall happiness of all concerned.
14. Failing Kant’s test of the Categorical Imperative reveals itself in:
   a. a decrease in the overall welfare.
   b. a decrease in the overall welfare, if acted upon.
   c. an invalid argument.
   d. an inconsistency.

15. Kant’s claim about a maxim permitting indifference to the welfare of others is that:
   a. it would greatly diminish overall utility.
   b. it would greatly diminish happiness.
   c. it could not be in harmony with a universal law of nature.
   d. it could not be willed to be a universal law of nature.

16. The Categorical Imperative is most similar to which of the following:
   a. the Bill of Rights.
   b. the Declaration of Independence.
   c. the Golden Rule.
   d. the Ten Commandments.

17. A person who does the morally right action, but for the motive of self-interest would be, for Kant:
   a. acting in accordance with duty but not out of duty.
   b. acting out of duty but not in accordance with duty.
   c. acting both in accordance with and out of duty.
   d. acting neither in accordance with nor out of duty.
Quiz 10

Plato, Apology

1. Which of the following analogies does Socrates compel Meletus to accept in the Apology:
   a. agnosticism is to belief as atheism is to disbelief.
   b. Socrates is loyal to the city as Meletus is loyal to it.
   c. Socrates imparts knowledge to the youth as teachers impart knowledge to students.
   d. horses are to horse activities as gods are to divine activities.

2. In the Apology Socrates takes the Oracle’s pronouncement that Socrates is wisest to mean that:
   a. Socrates has great knowledge.
   b. Socrates knows only that he lacks most knowledge.
   c. Socrates does not know that he has much knowledge.
   d. although others have knowledge, Socrates knows more.

3. Socrates says “You cannot be believed, Meletus, even, I think, by yourself” because:
   a. Meletus affirms that Socrates believes in gods and that he is an atheist.
   b. Meletus is insincere in his prosecution of Socrates for not believing in the gods of the city.
   c. Meletus fails to recognize that if one believes in divine activities one must believe in gods.
   d. Meletus prosecutes Socrates for disloyalty to the city, but Meletus fails to care about the youth of the city.

4. In the Apology, the legal deposition against Socrates alleges that he:
   a. believes in false gods.
   b. does not believe in true gods.
   c. is an agnostic.
   d. is an atheist.

5. Socrates claims that, despite the jury’s verdict, he cannot stop philosophizing and speaking because:
   a. he enjoys it.
   b. it is of the greatest importance.
   c. to stop would be to disobey the gods.
   d. others want to hear him.
Quiz 11
Darwall, “Hobbes”

1. A main implication of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is that:
a. acting to maximize self-interest can lead one to a worse outcome than a cooperative strategy.
b. it is not rational to seek one’s own self-interest.
c. cooperation will make one better off in a social situation even where everyone else is cooperating.
d. The outcome that promises one the greatest gain, when the other cooperates, is to cooperate.

2. The approach to morality that the Prisoner’s Dilemma lends the most support to is:
a. Kantian.
b. Utilitarian.
c. morality arises naturally from enlightened self-interest.
d. relativism, in which moral principles are relative to the values of different persons or societies.

3. The Prisoner’s Dilemma involves the benefits of:
a. cooperation for both outweighs the benefits of acting on self-interest by either.
b. cooperation outweighs the benefits of non-cooperation.
c. cooperation for both outweighs the benefits of acting on self-interest by both.
d. acting on self-interest, when the other acts cooperatively, is better for the one who cooperates.

4. For each participant in a Prisoner’s Dilemma, the outcome of all cooperating is:
a. Best.
b. 2nd best.
c. 3rd best.
d. 4th best.

5. In a Prisoner’s Dilemma, we assume participants are motivated to cooperate by:
a. goodness.
b. self-interest.
c. threat.
d. luck.
Quiz 12

- Foot, “The Problem of Abortion and the Doctrine of the Double Effect”
- Thomson, “A Defense of Abortion”
- Singer, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”
- Nagel, “War and Massacre”

1. According to Nagel, the Kantian view directly challenged by the possibility (moral) conflict or dilemmas is:
   a. the categorical imperative applies to all rational beings.
   b. the good will is good in itself.
   c. the moral worth of an action depends upon the motive.
   d. “ought” implies “can”

2. According to Nagel, absolutism, focuses on:
   a. what one does, while utilitarianism focuses on what will happen.
   b. what will happen, while utilitarianism focuses on what one does.
   c. both what one does and what will happen.
   d. either what one does or what will happen, but not both at the same time.

3. According to Foot, the doctrine of double effect holds, roughly, that:
   a. an act that is permissible if done directly (directly intended) may be impermissible if done indirectly (as a foreseen consequence).
   b. an act that is impermissible if done directly remains impermissible if done indirectly.
   c. an act that is impermissible if done directly may be permissible if done indirectly.
   d. an act that is impermissible if done indirectly may be permissible if done directly.

4. The distinction that Foot finds behind the doctrine of double effect, rendering it plausible, is that between:
   a. what we do and what we allow.
   b. what we do and what we intend.
   c. positive and negative duties.
   d. what we intend to do and what we want to do.

5. One case that shows a clear advantage to the distinction between positive and negative duties over the doctrine of double effect is:
   a. the case of the judge who to save 5 must find guilty 1 innocent.
   b. the case of the runaway train where to save 5, the train must be steered to kill 1.
   c. the case of abortion is which either the fetus or the mother can survive but not both, and we must choose which to save.
   d. the case of abortion in which the fetus will die no matter what, but the mother can be saved only by aborting the pregnancy.
6. Thomson’s violinist case is a counterexample to which of the following:
   a. one may never perform an act resulting in the death of an innocent person.
   b. abortion is wrong.
   c. an act that is wrong if directly intended may be permissible if an indirect consequence.
   d. a fetus is a person.

7. A crucial disanalogy between Thomson’s violinist case and most pregnancies that she addresses is the:
   a. age of the person to which one is attached.
   b. element of coercion.
   c. length of time of the attachment.
   d. attachment not being due to sex.

8. Thomson does not take her defense of abortion to apply to:
   a. pregnancy for which precautions have been taken.
   b. pregnancy where contraception is unavailable.
   c. killing the fetus as well as ending the pregnancy.
   d. rape or incest.

9. For Thomson, if you end the hookup with the violinist or pregnancy where it lasts only an hour then you:
   a. violate the right of the violinist/fetus.
   b. fall just below being a Good Samaritan.
   c. act immorally.
   d. fall below being a minimally Good Samaritan.

10. The “pod people fetuses” that float around until they find a good resting place to grow, such as a rug, is a thought experiment that Thomson offers to show that:
    a. pregnancy is not a necessary condition for fetal development.
    b. the destruction of such fetuses would not violate a right to life.
    c. coercion is not necessary for the violinist case.
    d. voluntary and known risk is insufficient for an invitation.

11. Thomson:
    a. claims that the fetus is a person.
    b. concedes for the sake of argument that the fetus is a person.
    c. argues that the fetus is not a person.
    d. supposes that the fetus is not a person.

12. On Singer’s view, much of what we take to be charity is really:
    a. optional.
    b. selfish.
    c. unethical.
    d. duty.
13. Singer’s main principle depends crucially on the affluent:
   a. bearing responsibility for the threat of famine to others.
   b. being not far away from those suffering under famine.
   c. being able to give much aid to those in desperate need without significant cost to themselves.
   d. being obliged to give aid only at the level of others, who are similarly affluent.

14. For Singer, the extent of the obligation for the affluent to give aid is determined by:
   a. what others should give.
   b. what others are actually expected to give.
   c. their own willingness to give.
   d. their degree of responsibility to those under famine.

15. Singer’s central principle seems to have the counter-intuitive consequence that most of us, who are affluent, are obliged to give:
   a. much more than we actually do give.
   b. much more than we think we should give.
   c. until we drop near to the level needed to survive.
   d. until we reach the level of giving that is standard.
Quiz 13

Mill, “Social Liberty”

1. Mill’s Harm Principle is meant as protection:
   a. for pornography.
   b. against tyranny of the government.
   c. against tyranny of prevailing opinion.
   d. against both tyranny of government and prevailing opinion.

2. As applied to laws against an individual’s use of drugs, Mill’s Harm Principle would:
   a. not protect the individual, since drugs cause physical harm.
   b. reject them, since it is wrong to interfere with the individual’s liberty.
   c. depend for its application upon the judgment of the majority.
   d. reject them only where children are involved.

3. For Mill, to attempt to suppress an opinion as false is to:
   a. violate the principle of utility.
   b. violate the Harm Principle.
   c. assume one’s infallibility.
   d. violate the Categorical Imperative.

4. Which of the following are values of utility that Mill does not appeal to in defending the Harm Principle:
   a. truth.
   b. encouragement of radical thought or genius.
   c. the improvement of opinions.
   d. the costs of police enforcement of censorship.

5. In On Liberty, Mill defends the view that:
   a. no one ought to interfere with another’s liberty.
   b. no one ought to interfere with another’s liberty, except to protect that person from harming themselves.
   c. no one ought to interfere with another’s liberty, except to protect others from being harmed.
   d. we each have a right to freedom of expression and thought.

6. For Mill, the value that liberty of thought and expression best protects and promotes is:
   a. happiness.
   b. utility.
   c. individual rights.
   d. truth.
7. Mill claims that his defense of liberty appeals only to:
   a. utility.
   b. rights.
   c. goodness.
   d. natural facts.
Quiz 14

- Clifford, “The Ethics of Belief”
- James, “The Will to Believe”
- Williams, “Deciding to Believe”

1. For Williams, one cannot:
a. place oneself in a position where one comes to believe that \( p \).
b. want to believe that \( p \), while believing that \( p \).
c. falsely believe that \( p \).
d. come to believe that \( p \) because one wants to.

2. The fundamental point of disagreement between Clifford and James is whether it is ever right or proper:
a. to believe with insufficient evidence.
b. to have faith where evidence is insufficient.
c. to doubt in the face of overwhelmingly positive evidence.
d. to believe in science with insufficient evidence.

3. James holds that it is proper to “will to believe” when the issue (or option) is:
a. living, avoidable, momentous and the aim of avoiding error is primary.
b. living, forced, momentous, and the aim of avoiding error is primary.
c. dead, forced, momentous, and the aim of gaining truth is primary.
d. living, forced, momentous, and the aim of gaining truth is primary.

4. If belief aims at truth, then Williams argues you cannot believe anything:
a. false.
b. while believing it is improbable.
c. without that belief being based on evidence.
d. while believing that you chose to believe it.

5. James takes agnosticism to be:
a. indefensible.
b. practically equivalent to atheism.
c. a poor option.
d. preferable to outright disbelief in god.

6. Which of the following is NOT, for James, a condition on its being rational to will to believe? The putative belief is:
a. momentous.
b. living.
c. a force option.
d. a source of hope.
7. James argues that in those cases where it is proper to will to believe, then practically:
   a. not believing is no different from disbelieving.
   b. not believing implies disbelieving.
   c. disbelieving implies not believing.
   d. not believing is very different from disbelieving.

8. Moore’s Paradox, as discussed by Williams, claims that sentences of the form “but I do not believe that \( p \)”:  
   a. cannot be true.
   b. are self-contradictions.
   c. are contradictory to assert.
   d. are improbable.

9. James attempts to assimilate the relation of belief and negation (“not”) to the logical law that for every statement \( p \):
   a. either \( p \) is true or \( \neg p \) is true.
   b. it is not the case that \( p \) is true and \( \neg p \) is not true.
   c. if \( p \) is necessarily false, then \( p \) is false.
   d. \( p \) is not both true and false.
Answer Key


