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Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem (Second Edition)

Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem (Second Edition)

Edited, with Introduction, by David M. Rosenthal

2000 - 323 pp.

Format ISBN Price Qty
Cloth 978-0-87220-479-9
$38.00
Paper 978-0-87220-478-2
$14.00
Examination 978-0-87220-478-2
$2.00

Quick Overview

Expanded and updated to include a wide range of classic and contemporary works, this new edition of David Rosenthal's anthology provides a selection of the most important and influential writings on materialism and the mind-body problem.

OR

Expanded and updated to include a wide range of classic and contemporary works, this new edition of David Rosenthal's anthology provides a selection of the most important and influential writings on materialism and the mind-body problem.

 

Contents:

Introduction, with Addendum.

I. CLASSICAL MATERIALISM.
Descartes, Discourse, pt V; from the letter to the Marquis of Newcastle; from the letter to Henry More; from Meditations on First Philosophy, Sixth Meditation.
Spinoza: from Ethics, pts I-III.
Hobbes: Selections from Leviathan, pt I, chs 1, 2 and 3; from De Corpore, pt IV, ch 25.

II. THE IDENTITY THESIS.
J. J. C. Smart: “Sensations and the Brain Processes.”
J. Shaffer: “Mental Events and the Brain.”
J. W. Cornman: “The Identity of Mind and Body.”

III. THEORETICAL MATERIALISM.
J. Kim: “On the Psycho-Physical Identity Theory.”
T. Nagel: “Physicalism”; Postscript (November 1968).
K. Gunderson: “Asymmetrics and Mind-Body Perplexities.”

IV. FUNCTIONALISTIC MATERIALISM.
J. A. Fodor: “Materialism.”
H. Putnam: “The Nature of Mental States.”
D. K. Lewis: “An Argument for the Identity Theory”, with addenda (October 1969).

V. ELIMINATIVE MATERIALISM.
P. Feyerabend: “Mental Events and the Brain.”
R. Rorty: “Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories”.
R. J. Bernstein: “The Challenge of Scientific Materialism.”
R. Rorty: “In Defense of Eliminative Materialism.”

VI. INTENTIONALITY AND QUALIA.
D. Davidson: “Mental Events.”
F. Jackson: “Epiphenomenal Qualia.”
P. Churchland: “Reduction, Qualia, and the Direct Introspection of Brain States.”
F. Jackson: “Postscript on Qualia.”
D. Lewis: “Should a Materialist Believe in Qualia?”

Bibliography (with selective update)

 

About the Author:

David M. Rosenthal is Professor of Philosophy, Graduate School and University Center, City University of New York.