LIST OF PROPOSITIONS
FROM THE ETHICS

Part I: Concerning God

Definitions (3)
Axioms (4)

P1 Substance is by nature prior to its affections. (4)
P2 Two substances having different attributes have nothing in common. (4)
P3 When things have nothing in common, one cannot be the cause of the other. (5)
P4 Two or more distinct things are distinguished from one another either by the difference of the attributes of the substances or by the difference of the affections of the substances. (5)
P5 In the universe there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attribute. (5)
P6 One substance cannot be produced by another substance. (5)
P7 Existence belongs to the nature of substance. (6)
P8 Every substance is necessarily infinite. (6)
P9 The more reality or being a thing has, the more attributes it has. (7)
P10 Each attribute of one substance must be conceived through itself. (7)
P11 God, or substance consisting of infinite attributes, each of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists. (8)
P12 No attribute or substance can be truly conceived from which it would follow that substance can be divided. (10)
P13 Absolutely infinite substance is indivisible. (10)
P14 There can be, or be conceived, no other substance but God. (10)
P15 Whatever is, is in God, and nothing can be or be conceived without God. (10)
P16 From the necessity of the divine nature there must follow infinite things in infinite ways [modis] (that is, everything that can come within the scope of infinite intellect). (13)
P17 God acts solely from the laws of his own nature, constrained by none. (14)
P18 God is the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things. (15)
P19 God [is eternal], that is, all the attributes of God are eternal. (16)
P20 God’s existence and his essence are one and the same. (16)
P21 All things that follow from the absolute nature of any attribute of God must have existed always, and as infinite; that is, through the said attribute they are eternal and infinite. (16)
P22 Whatever follows from some attribute of God, insofar as the attribute is modified by a modification that exists necessarily and as infinite through that same attribute, must also exist both necessarily and as infinite. (17)

P23 Every mode which exists necessarily and as infinite must have necessarily followed either from the absolute nature of some attribute of God or from some attribute modified by a modification which exists necessarily and as infinite. (17)

P24 The essence of things produced by God does not involve existence. (18)

P25 God is the efficient cause not only of the existence of things but also of their essence. (18)

P26 A thing which has been determined to act in a particular way has necessarily been so determined by God; and a thing which has not been determined by God cannot determine itself to act. (18)

P27 A thing which has been determined by God to act in a particular way cannot render itself undetermined. (18)

P28 Every individual thing, i.e., anything whatever which is finite and has a determinate existence, cannot exist or be determined to act unless it be determined to exist and to act by another cause which is also finite and has a determinate existence, and this cause again cannot exist or be determined to act unless it be determined to exist and to act by another cause which is also finite and has a determinate existence, and so ad infinitum. (18)

P29 Nothing in nature is contingent, but all things are from the necessity of the divine nature determined to exist and to act in a definite way. (19)

P30 The finite intellect in act or the infinite intellect in act must comprehend the attributes of God and the affections of God, and nothing else. (20)

P31 The intellect in act, whether it be finite or infinite, as also will, desire, love, etc., must be related to Natura naturata, not to Natura naturans. (20)

P32 Will cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary cause. (21)

P33 Things could not have been produced by God in any other way or in any other order than is the case. (21)

P34 God's power is his very essence. (24)

P35 Whatever we conceive to be within God's power necessarily exists. (24)

P36 Nothing exists from whose nature an effect does not follow. (24)

Appendix (24)
Part II: Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind

Definitions (29)

Axioms (30)

P1 Thought is an attribute of God; i.e., God is a thinking thing. (30)

P2 Extension is an attribute of God; i.e., God is an extended thing. (30)

P3 In God there is necessarily the idea both of his essence and of everything that necessarily follows from his essence. (30)

P4 The idea of God, from which infinite things follow in infinite ways, must be one, and one only. (31)

P5 The formal being of ideas recognizes God as its cause only insofar as he is considered as a thinking thing, and not insofar as he is explicated by any other attribute; that is, the ideas both of God’s attributes and of individual things recognize as their efficient cause not the things of which they are ideas, that is, the things perceived, but God himself insofar as he is a thinking thing. (31)

P6 The modes of any attribute have God for their cause only insofar as he is considered under that attribute, and not insofar as he is considered under any other attribute. (32)

P7 The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order and connection of things. (32)

P8 The ideas of nonexisting individual things or modes must be comprehended in the infinite idea of God in the same way as the formal essences of individual things or modes are contained in the attributes of God. (33)

P9 The idea of an individual thing existing in actuality has God for its cause not insofar as he is infinite but insofar as he is considered as affected by another idea of a thing existing in actuality, of which God is the cause insofar as he is affected by a third idea, and so ad infinitum. (33)

P10 The being of substance does not pertain to the essence of man; i.e., substance does not constitute the form [forma] of man. (34)

P11 That which constitutes the actual being of the human mind is basically nothing else but the idea of an individual actually existing thing. (35)

P12 Whatever happens in the object of the idea constituting the human mind is bound to be perceived by the human mind; i.e., the idea of that thing will necessarily be in the human mind. That is to say, if the object of the idea constituting the human mind is a body, nothing can happen in that body without its being perceived by the mind. (36)

P13 The object of the idea constituting the human mind is the body—i.e., a definite mode of extension actually existing, and nothing else. (36)
P14  The human mind is capable of perceiving a great many things, and this capacity will vary in proportion to the variety of states which its body can assume. (40)

P15  The idea which constitutes the formal being of the human mind is not simple, but composed of very many ideas. (40)

P16  The idea of any mode wherein the human body is affected by external bodies must involve the nature of the human body together with the nature of the external body. (40)

P17  If the human body is affected in a way [modo] that involves the nature of some external body, the human mind will regard that same external body as actually existing, or as present to itself, until the human body undergoes a further modification which excludes the existence or presence of the said body. (41)

P18  If the human body has once been affected by two or more bodies at the same time, when the mind afterward imagines one of them, it will straightway remember the others too. (42)

P19  The human mind has no knowledge of the body, nor does it know it to exist, except through ideas of the affections by which the body is affected. (43)

P20  There is also in God the idea or knowledge of the human mind, and this follows in God and is related to God in the same way as the idea or knowledge of the human body. (43)

P21  This idea of the mind is united to the mind in the same way as the mind is united to the body. (43)

P22  The human mind perceives not only the affections of the body but also the ideas of these affections. (44)

P23  The mind does not know itself except insofar as it perceives ideas of affections of the body. (44)

P24  The human mind does not involve an adequate knowledge of the component parts of the human body. (44)

P25  The idea of any affection of the human body does not involve an adequate knowledge of an external body. (45)

P26  The human mind does not perceive any external body as actually existing except through the ideas of affections of its own body. (45)

P27  The idea of any affection of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of the human body. (46)

P28  The ideas of the affections of the human body, insofar as they are related only to the human mind, are not clear and distinct, but confused. (46)

P29  The idea of the idea of any affection of the human body does not involve adequate knowledge of the human mind. (46)

P30  We can have only a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body. (47)

P31  We can have only a very inadequate knowledge of the duration of particular things external to us. (47)
All ideas are true insofar as they are related to God. (47)
There is nothing positive in ideas whereby they can be said to be false. (48)
Every idea which in us is absolute, that is, adequate and perfect, is true. (48)
Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge which inadequate ideas, that is, fragmentary and confused ideas, involve. (48)
Inadequate and confused ideas follow by the same necessity as adequate, or clear and distinct, ideas. (48)
That which is common to all things (see Lemma 2 above) and is equally in the part as in the whole does not constitute the essence of any one particular thing. (49)
Those things that are common to all things and are equally in the part as in the whole can be conceived only adequately. (49)
Of that which is common and proper to the human body and to any external bodies by which the human body is customarily affected, and which is equally in the part as well as in the whole of any of these bodies, the idea also in the mind will be adequate. (49)
Whatever ideas follow in the mind from ideas that are adequate in it are also adequate. (50)
Knowledge of the first kind is the only cause of falsity; knowledge of the second and third kind is necessarily true. (52)
Knowledge of the second and third kind, and not knowledge of the first kind, teaches us to distinguish true from false. (52)
He who has a true idea knows at the same time that he has a true idea, and cannot doubt its truth. (52)
It is not in the nature of reason to regard things as contingent, but as necessary. (53)
Every idea of any body or particular thing existing in actuality necessarily involves the eternal and infinite essence of God. (54)
The knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God which each idea involves is adequate and perfect. (55)
The human mind has an adequate knowledge of the eternal and infinite essence of God. (55)
In the mind there is no absolute, or free, will. The mind is determined to this or that volition by a cause, which is likewise determined by another cause, and this again by another, and so ad infinitum. (55)
There is in the mind no volition, that is, affirmation and negation, except that which an idea, insofar as it is an idea, involves. (56)
Postulates (62)

P1  Our mind is in some instances active and in other instances passive. Insofar as it has adequate ideas, it is necessarily active; and insofar as it has inadequate ideas, it is necessarily passive. (62)

P2  The body cannot determine the mind to think, nor can the mind determine the body to motion or rest, or to anything else (if there is anything else). (63)

P3  The active states [actiones] of the mind arise only from adequate ideas; its passive states depend solely on inadequate ideas. (65)

P4  No thing can be destroyed except by an external cause. (66)

P5  Things are of a contrary nature, that is, unable to subsist in the same subject, to the extent that one can destroy the other. (66)

P6  Each thing, insofar as it is in itself, endeavors to persist in its own being. (66)

P7  The conatus with which each thing endeavors to persist in its own being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing itself. (66)

P8  The conatus with which each single thing endeavors to persist in its own being does not involve finite time, but indefinite time. (67)

P9  The mind, both insofar as it has clear and distinct ideas and insofar as it has confused ideas, endeavors to persist in its own being over an indefinite period of time, and is conscious of this conatus. (67)

P10 An idea that excludes the existence of our body cannot be in our mind, but is contrary to it. (67)

P11 Whatevery increases or diminishes, assists or checks, the power of activity of our body, the idea of the said thing increases or diminishes, assists or checks the power of thought of our mind. (68)

P12 The mind, as far as it can, endeavors to think of those things that increase or assist the body’s power of activity. (69)

P13 When the mind thinks of those things that diminish or check the body’s power of activity, it endeavors, as far as it can, to call to mind those things that exclude the existence of the former. (69)

P14 If the mind has once been affected by two emotions at the same time, when it is later affected by the one it will also be affected by the other. (69)

P15 Anything can indirectly [per accidens] be the cause of Pleasure, Pain, or Desire. (70)

P16 From the mere fact that we imagine a thing to have something similar to an object that is wont to affect the mind with pleasure or pain, we shall love it or hate it, although the point of similarity is not the efficient cause of these emotions. (70)

P17 If we imagine that a thing which is wont to affect us with an emotion of pain has something similar to another thing which is wont to affect us with an equally great emotion of pleasure, we shall hate it and love it at the same time. (70)
From the image of things past or future man is affected by the same emotion of pleasure or pain as from the image of a thing present. (71)

He who imagines that what he loves is being destroyed will feel pain. If, however, he imagines that it is being preserved, he will feel pleasure. (72)

He who imagines that a thing that he hates is being destroyed will feel pleasure. (72)

He who imagines that what he loves is affected with pleasure or pain will likewise be affected with pleasure or pain, the intensity of which will vary with the intensity of the emotion in the object loved. (72)

If we imagine that someone is affecting with pleasure the object of our love, we shall be affected with love toward him. If on the other hand we think that he is affecting with pain the object of our love, we shall likewise be affected with hatred toward him. (73)

He who imagines that what he hates is affected with pain will feel pleasure; if, on the other hand, he thinks of it as affected with pleasure, he will feel pain. Both of these emotions will vary in intensity inversely with the variation of the contrary emotion in that which he hates. (73)

If we imagine someone to be affecting with pleasure a thing that we hate, we shall be affected with hate toward him too. If on the other hand we think of him as affecting with pain the said thing, we shall be affected with love toward him. (74)

We endeavor to affirm of ourselves and of an object loved whatever we imagine affects us or the loved object with pleasure, and, on the other hand, to negate whatever we imagine affects us or the loved object with pain. (74)

We endeavor to do whatever we imagine men to regard with pleasure, and on the other hand we shun doing whatever we imagine men to regard with aversion. (76)

If anyone has done something which he imagines affects others with pleasure, he will be affected with pleasure accompanied by the idea of himself as cause; that is, he will regard himself with pleasure. If, on the other hand, he imagines he has done
something which affects others with pain, he will regard himself
with pain. (76)
P31 If we think that someone loves, desires, or hates something that we
love, desire, or hate, that very fact will cause us to love, desire, or
hate the thing more steadfastly. But if we think he dislikes what
we love, or vice versa, then our feelings will fluctuate. (77)
P32 If we think that someone enjoys something that only one person
can possess, we shall endeavor to bring it about that he should not
possess that thing. (77)
P33 If we love something similar to ourselves, we endeavor, as far as we
can, to bring it about that it should love us in return. (78)
P34 The greater the emotion with which we imagine the object of our
love is affected toward us, the greater will be our vanity. (78)
P35 If anyone thinks that there is between the object of his love and
another person the same or a more intimate bond of friendship
than there was between them when he alone used to possess the
object loved, he will be affected with hatred toward the object
loved and will envy his rival. (78)
P36 He who recalls a thing which once afforded him pleasure desires
to possess the same thing in the same circumstances as when he
first took pleasure therein. (79)
P37 The desire arising from pain or pleasure, hatred or love, is
proportionately greater as the emotion is greater. (80)
P38 If anyone has begun to hate the object of his love to the extent
that his love is completely extinguished, he will, other things being
equal, bear greater hatred toward it than if he had never loved it,
and his hatred will be proportionate to the strength of his former
love. (80)
P39 He who hates someone will endeavor to injure him unless he fears
that he will suffer a greater injury in return. On the other hand,
he who loves someone will by that same law endeavor to benefit
him. (81)
P40 He who imagines he is hated by someone to whom he believes he
has given no cause for hatred will hate him in return. (81)
P41 If anyone thinks that he is loved by someone and believes that he
has given no cause for this (which is possible through Cor. Pr. 15
and Pr. 16, III), he will love him in return. (82)
P42 He who, moved by love or hope of honor, has conferred a benefit
on someone, will feel pain if he sees that the benefit is
ungratefully received. (83)
P43 Hatred is increased by reciprocal hatred, and may on the other
hand be destroyed by love. (83)
P44 Hatred that is fully overcome by love passes into love, and the love
will therefore be greater than if it had not been preceded by
hatred. (83)
If anyone imagines that someone similar to himself is affected with hatred toward a thing similar to himself, which he loves, he will hate him. (84)

If anyone is affected with pleasure or pain by someone of a class or nation different from his own and the pleasure or pain is accompanied by the idea of that person as its cause, under the general category of that class or nation, he will love or hate not only him but all of that same class or nation. (84)

The pleasure that arises from our imagining that the object of our hatred is being destroyed or is suffering some other harm is not devoid of some feeling of pain. (84)

Love and hatred toward, say, Peter are destroyed if the pain involved in the latter and the pleasure involved in the former are associated with the idea of a different cause; and both emotions are diminished to the extent that we think Peter not to have been the only cause of either emotion. (85)

Love and hatred toward a thing that we think of as free must both be greater, other conditions being equal, than toward a thing subject to necessity. (85)

Anything can be the indirect cause of hope or fear. (85)

Different men can be affected in different ways by one and the same object, and one and the same man can be affected by one and the same object in different ways at different times. (86)

To an object that we have previously seen in conjunction with others or that we imagine to have nothing but what is common to many other objects, we shall not give as much regard as to that which we imagine to have something singular. (87)

When the mind regards its own self and its power of activity, it feels pleasure, and the more so the more distinctly it imagines itself and its power of activity. (88)

The mind endeavors to think only of the things that affirm its power of activity. (88)

When the mind thinks of its own impotence, by that very fact it feels pain. (88)

There are as many kinds of pleasure, pain, desire and consequently of every emotion that is compounded of these (such as vacillation) or of every emotion that is derived from these (love, hatred, hope, fear, etc.), as there are kinds of objects by which we are affected. (89)

Any emotion of one individual differs from the emotion of another to the extent that the essence of the one individual differs from the essence of the other. (90)

Besides the pleasure and desire that are passive emotions, there are other emotions of pleasure and desire that are related to us insofar as we are active. (91)
Among all the emotions that are related to the mind insofar as it is active, there are none that are not related to pleasure or desire. (92)

Definitions of the Emotions (93)
General Definition of Emotions (101)

Part IV: Of Human Bondage, or the Strength of the Emotions

Preface (102)
Definitions (104)
Axiom (105)

P1 Nothing positive contained in a false idea can be annulled by the presence of what is true, insofar as it is true. (105)
P2 We are passive insofar as we are a part of Nature which cannot be conceived independently of other parts. (106)
P3 The force [vis] whereby a man persists in existing is limited, and infinitely surpassed by the power of external causes. (106)
P4 It is impossible for a man not to be part of Nature and not to undergo changes other than those which can be understood solely through his own nature and of which he is the adequate cause. (106)
P5 The force and increase of any passive emotion and its persistence in existing is defined not by the power whereby we ourselves endeavor to persist in existing, but by the power of external causes compared with our own power. (107)
P6 The force of any passive emotion can surpass the rest of man’s activities or power so that the emotion stays firmly fixed in him. (107)
P7 An emotion cannot be checked or destroyed except by a contrary emotion which is stronger than the emotion which is to be checked. (107)
P8 Knowledge of good and evil is nothing other than the emotion of pleasure or pain insofar as we are conscious of it. (108)
P9 An emotion whose cause we think to be with us in the present is stronger than it would be if we did not think the said cause to be with us. (108)
P10 We are affected toward a future thing which we imagine to be imminent more intensely than if we were to imagine its time of existence to be farther away from the present. We are also affected by remembrance of a thing we imagine to belong to the near past more intensely than if we were to imagine it to belong to the distant past. (109)
P11 An emotion toward a thing which we think of as inevitable [necessarius] is more intense, other things being equal, than emotion toward a thing possible, or contingent, that is, not inevitable. (109)
P12 Emotion toward a thing which we know not to exist in the present, and which we imagine to be possible, is, other things being equal, more intense than emotion toward a contingent thing. (109)
Emotion toward a contingent thing which we know not to exist in the present is, other things being equal, feebler than emotion toward a thing past. (110)

No emotion can be checked by the true knowledge of good and evil insofar as it is true, but only insofar as it is considered as an emotion. (110)

Desire that arises from the true knowledge of good and evil can be extinguished or checked by many other desires that arise from the emotions by which we are assailed. (110)

The desire that arises from a knowledge of good and evil insofar as this knowledge has regard to the future can be the more easily checked or extinguished by desire of things that are attractive in the present. (111)

Desire that arises from the true knowledge of good and evil insofar as this knowledge is concerned with contingent things can be even more easily checked by desire for things which are present. (111)

Desire arising from pleasure is, other things being equal, stronger than desire arising from pain. (111)

Every man, from the laws of his own nature, necessarily seeks or avoids what he judges to be good or evil. (113)

The more every man endeavors and is able to seek his own advantage, that is, to preserve his own being, the more he is endowed with virtue. On the other hand, insofar as he neglects to preserve what is to his advantage, that is, his own being, to that extent he is weak. (113)

Nobody can desire to be happy, to do well and to live well without at the same time desiring to be, to do, and to live; that is, actually to exist. (114)

No virtue can be conceived as prior to this one, namely, the conatus to preserve oneself. (114)

Insofar as a man is determined to some action from the fact that he has inadequate ideas, he cannot be said, without qualification, to be acting from virtue; he can be said to do so only insofar as he is determined from the fact that he understands. (114)

To act in absolute conformity with virtue is nothing else in us but to act, to live, to preserve one’s own being (these three mean the same) under the guidance of reason, on the basis of seeking one’s own advantage. (114)

Nobody endeavors to preserve his being for the sake of some other thing. (115)

Whatever we endeavor according to reason is nothing else but to understand; and the mind, insofar as it exercises reason, judges nothing else to be to its advantage except what conduces to understanding. (115)

We know nothing to be certainly good or evil except what is really conducive to understanding or what can hinder understanding. (115)
P28  The mind's highest good is the knowledge of God, and the mind's highest virtue is to know God. (115)

P29  No individual thing whose nature is quite different from ours can either assist or check our power to act, and nothing whatsoever can be either good or evil for us unless it has something in common with us. (116)

P30  No thing can be evil for us through what it possesses in common with our nature, but insofar as it is evil for us, it is contrary to us. (116)

P31  Insofar as a thing is in agreement with our nature, to that extent it is necessarily good. (116)

P32  Insofar as men are subject to passive emotions, to that extent they cannot be said to agree in nature. (117)

P33  Men can differ in nature insofar as they are assailed by emotions that are passive, and to that extent one and the same man, too, is variable and inconstant. (117)

P34  Insofar as men are assailed by emotions that are passive, they can be contrary to one another. (118)

P35  Insofar as men live under the guidance of reason, to that extent only do they always necessarily agree in nature. (118)

P36  The highest good of those who pursue virtue is common to all, and all can equally enjoy it. (119)

P37  The good which every man who pursues virtue aims at for himself he will also desire for the rest of mankind, and all the more as he acquires a greater knowledge of God. (120)

P38  That which so disposes the human body that it can be affected in more ways, or which renders it capable of affecting external bodies in more ways, is advantageous to man, and proportionately more advantageous as the body is thereby rendered more capable of being affected in more ways and of affecting other bodies in more ways. On the other hand, that which renders the body less capable in these respects is harmful. (122)

P39  Whatever is conducive to the preservation of the proportion of motion-and-rest, which the parts of the human body maintain toward one another, is good; and those things that effect a change in the proportion of motion-and-rest of the parts of the human body to one another are bad. (123)

P40  Whatever is conducive to man's social organization, or causes men to live in harmony, is advantageous, while those things that introduce discord into the state are bad. (123)

P41  Pleasure is not in itself bad, but good. On the other hand, pain is in itself bad. (124)

P42  Cheerfulness [hilaritas] cannot be excessive; it is always good. On the other hand, melancholy is always bad. (124)

P43  Titillation [titillatio] can be excessive and bad. But anguish [dolor] can be good to the extent that titillation or pleasure is bad. (124)
P44  Love and desire can be excessive. (124)
P45  Hatred can never be good. (125)
P46  He who lives by the guidance of reason endeavors as far as he can to repay with love or nobility another’s hatred, anger, contempt, etc. toward himself. (126)
P47  The emotions of hope and fear cannot be good in themselves. (126)
P48  The emotions of over-esteem [existimatio] and disparagement [despectus] are always bad. (127)
P49  Over-esteem is apt to render its recipient proud. (127)
P50  In the man who lives by the guidance of reason, pity is in itself bad and disadvantageous. (127)
P51  Approbation [favor] is not opposed to reason; it can agree with reason and arise from it. (127)
P52  Self-contentment [acquiescentia in se ipso] can arise from reason, and only that self-contentment which arises from reason is the highest there can be. (128)
P53  Humility is not a virtue; that is, it does not arise from reason. (128)
P54  Repentance is not a virtue, i.e., it does not arise from reason; he who repents of his action is doubly unhappy or weak. (129)
P55  Extreme pride, or self-abasement, is extreme ignorance of oneself. (129)
P56  Extreme pride, or self-abasement, indicates extreme weakness of spirit. (129)
P57  The proud man loves the company of parasites or flatterers, and hates the company of those of noble spirit. (130)
P58  Honor is not opposed to reason, but can arise from it. (131)
P59  In the case of all actions to which we are determined by a passive emotion, we can be determined thereto by reason without that emotion. (131)
P60  Desire that arises from the pleasure or pain that is related to one or more, but not to all, parts of the body takes no account of the advantage of the whole man. (132)
P61  Desire that arises from reason cannot be excessive. (133)
P62  Insofar as the mind conceives things in accordance with the dictates of reason, it is equally affected whether the idea be of the future, in the past, or the present. (133)
P63  He who is guided by fear, and does good so as to avoid evil, is not guided by reason. (133)
P64  Knowledge of evil is inadequate knowledge. (134)
P65  By the guidance of reason we pursue the greater of two goods and the lesser of two evils. (134)
P66  Under the guidance of reason we seek a future greater good in preference to a lesser present good, and a lesser present evil in preference to a greater future evil. (135)
P67  A free man thinks of death least of all things, and his wisdom is a meditation of life, not of death. (135)
P68 If men were born free, they would form no conception of good and evil so long as they were free. (135)
P69 The virtue of a free man is seen to be as great in avoiding dangers as in overcoming them. (136)
P70 The free man who lives among ignorant people tries as far as he can to avoid receiving favors from them. (136)
P71 Only free men are truly grateful to one another. (137)
P72 The free man never acts deceitfully, but always with good faith. (137)
P73 The man who is guided by reason is more free in a state where he lives under a system of law than in solitude where [he] obeys only himself. (137)

Appendix (138)

Part V: Of the Power of the Intellect, or of Human Freedom

Preface (143)
Axioms (145)
P1 The affections of the body, that is, the images of things, are arranged and connected in the body in exactly the same way as thoughts and the ideas of things are arranged and connected in the mind. (145)
P2 If we remove an agitation of the mind, or emotion, from the thought of its external cause, and join it to other thoughts, then love or hatred toward the external cause, and also vacillations, that arise from these emotions will be destroyed. (145)
P3 A passive emotion ceases to be a passive emotion as soon as we form a clear and distinct idea of it. (145)
P4 There is no affection of the body of which we cannot form a clear and distinct conception. (146)
P5 An emotion toward a thing which we imagine merely in itself, and not as necessary, possible, or contingent, is the greatest of all emotions, other things being equal. (146)
P6 Insofar as the mind understands all things as governed by necessity, to that extent it has greater power over emotions, i.e., it is less passive in respect of them. (147)
P7 Emotions which arise or originate from reason are, if we take account of time, more powerful than those that are related to particular things which we regard as absent. (147)
P8 The greater the number of causes that simultaneously concur in arousing an emotion, the greater the emotion. (148)
P9 An emotion that is related to several different causes, which the mind regards together with the emotion itself, is less harmful, and we suffer less from it and are less affected toward each individual cause, than if we were affected by another equally great emotion which is related to only one or to a few causes. (148)
P10  As long as we are not assailed by emotions that are contrary to our nature, we have the power to arrange and associate affections of the body according to the order of the intellect. (148)

P11  In proportion as a mental image is related to more things, the more frequently does it occur—i.e., the more often it springs to life—and the more it engages the mind. (150)

P12  Images are more readily associated with those images that are related to things which we clearly and distinctly understand than they are to others. (150)

P13  The greater the number of other images with which an image is associated, the more often it springs to life. (150)

P14  The mind can bring it about that all the affections of the body—i.e., images of things—be related to the idea of God. (150)

P15  He who clearly and distinctly understands himself and his emotions loves God, and the more so the more he understands himself and his emotions. (150)

P16  This love toward God is bound to hold chief place in the mind. (151)

P17  God is without passive emotions, and he is not affected with any emotion of pleasure or pain. (151)

P18  Nobody can hate God. (151)

P19  He who loves God cannot endeavor that God should love him in return. (151)

P20  This love toward God cannot be tainted with emotions of envy or jealousy, but is the more fostered as we think more men to be joined to God by this same bond of love. (151)

P21  The mind can exercise neither imagination nor memory save while the body endures. (153)

P22  Nevertheless, there is necessarily in God an idea which expresses the essence of this or that human body under a form of eternity [sub specie aeternitatis]. (153)

P23  The human mind cannot be absolutely destroyed along with body, but something of it remains, which is eternal. (153)

P24  The more we understand particular things, the more we understand God. (154)

P25  The highest conatus of the mind and its highest virtue is to understand things by the third kind of knowledge. (154)

P26  The more capable the mind is of understanding things by the third kind of knowledge, the more it desires to understand things by this same kind of knowledge. (154)

P27  From this third kind of knowledge there arises the highest possible contentment of mind. (154)

P28  The conatus, or desire, to know things by the third kind of knowledge cannot arise from the first kind of knowledge, but from the second. (155)
P29 Whatever the mind understands under a form of eternity it does not understand from the fact that it conceives the present actual existence of the body, but from the fact that it conceives the essence of the body under a form of eternity. (155)

P30 Our mind, insofar as it knows both itself and the body under a form of eternity, necessarily has a knowledge of God, and knows that it is in God and is conceived through God. (155)

P31 The third kind of knowledge depends on the mind as its formal cause insofar as the mind is eternal. (155)

P32 We take pleasure in whatever we understand by the third kind of knowledge, and this is accompanied by the idea of God as cause. (156)

P33 The intellectual love of God which arises from the third kind of knowledge is eternal. (156)

P34 It is only while the body endures that the mind is subject to passive emotions. (157)

P35 God loves himself with an infinite intellectual love. (157)

P36 The mind’s intellectual love toward God is the love of God wherewith God loves himself not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he can be explicated through the essence of the human mind considered under a form of eternity. That is, the mind’s intellectual love toward God is part of the infinite love wherewith God loves himself. (157)

P37 There is nothing in Nature which is contrary to this intellectual love, or which can destroy it. (158)

P38 The greater the number of things the mind understands by the second and third kinds of knowledge, the less subject it is to emotions that are bad, and the less it fears death. (158)

P39 He whose body is capable of the greatest amount of activity has a mind whose greatest part is eternal. (159)

P40 The more perfection a thing has, the more active and the less passive it is. Conversely, the more active it is, the more perfect it is. (160)

P41 Even if we did not know that our mind is eternal, we should still regard as being of prime importance piety and religion and, to sum up completely, everything which in Part IV we showed to be related to courage and nobility. (160)

P42 Blessedness is not the reward of virtue, but virtue itself. We do not enjoy blessedness because we keep our lusts in check. On the contrary, it is because we enjoy blessedness that we are able to keep our lusts in check. (161)
This appendix provides a list of all the propositions, corollaries, and scholia in the *Ethics*, together with all the definitions, axioms, propositions, corollaries, and scholia to which Spinoza refers in the proofs of propositions and corollaries and in the scholia. The significance of a given item and its meaning are determined, to a large degree, by the roles that the item plays in the *Ethics*. The following list should be helpful to those who want to consult, for a given item, all the places that Spinoza recalls and uses it in the work. The citations in the right-hand column agree in both order and number with their appearance in each proposition. That is, their order reflects the order in which Spinoza refers to them in the text. Spinoza sometimes refers to the same proposition multiple times in the text, and each reference is recorded. We hope that this list will be a valuable aid to the study of the *Ethics*.

Abbreviations are as follows: P=Proposition; A=Axiom; D=Definition; C=Corollary; S=Scholium; L=Lemma; Post=Postulate; Def Em=Definitions of Emotions (at the end of Part III); Gen Def Em=General Definition of Emotions (at the end of Part III). Items in the right-hand column should be read, for example, IIIP17C=Part III, Proposition 17, Corollary.

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